http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts devoted to matters epistemic Sun, 22 Nov 2009 04:35:07 +0000 http://backend.userland.com/rss092 en Some people think that reasons are propositions. When you form a belief or perform an action, they say, your belief is based on a proposition, not another belief, an experience, a desire, or anything else mental. The basis of belief and action is one or more propositions. Call this view ... http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=1574 From Brian at TAR, news that Jonathan Schaffer and Susanna Schellenberg are going to Rutgers, along with the previously announced addition of Branden Fitelson. The trio helps Rutgers in a number of ways, but I note here the central impact of the trio in epistemology. Maybe now the ... http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=1557 Available here, and comments always appreciated, since changes are still possible. Mostly boilerplate stuff, though some new stuff on the truth connection in the last section, connecting with the impossibility results from Bovens/Hartmann as well as a brief preview of my own response to the problem of justified inconsistent ... http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=1555 The Philosophy Department at Northwestern will hold a one-day Epistemology conference on Northwestern's Evanston Campus on Wednesday, February 17, 2010.  The conference is free and open to the public. We especially welcome philosophers who will be in town for the Central APA meeting (Feb 17-20, 2010, Palmer House, Chicago). The conference ... http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=1551 I couldn't decide whether to post this here, at PEA Soup, or both.  So, I posted it at PEA Soup and thought I'd post a link here instead of double posting.  Some regular commentators comment both places, but many do not.  I've written up a post that concerns matters epistemic, ... http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=1546 Ralph's interesting post and penetrating discussion raised to my mind the central question of the relationship between access internalism and various principles about the connection between first-order and higher-order justification. The simplest are, where 'p' is a proposition and 'J' is the justification operator which can be read "it ... http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=1539 A quick reminder about the 2010 Episteme Conference in Edinburgh, which is being hosted by Edinburgh's epistemology research group. The conference topic is 'Cognitive Ecology: The Role of the Concept of Knowledge in our Social Cognitive Ecology', and if you haven't the foggiest idea what we have in mind by ... http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=1537 May 23-25, 2010; conference website here. From the website: The first St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR, pronounced (slăk΄ r)) will take place May 23-25, 2010 at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. The conference is designed to provide a forum for new work on practical and ... http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=1535 This blog post offers a refutation of the following “JJ” principle: (1) If you are justified in believing p, then you have the highest possible degree of justification for believing that you’re justified in believing p (in other words, you can be certain that you’re justified in believing p). The refutation will ... http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=1516 This is to announce the first annual Northwestern-Notre Dame Graduate Epistemology Conference, which is to take place on the campus of Northwestern University, in Evanston, IL, on April 16th, 2010.   The keynote speaker will be Hilary Kornblith of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. More information, including the CFP, can be found ... http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=1513