Certain Doubts

I just got a draft of the program for the Pacific Meeting, and will move it to the front closer to the event. But, having just posted on epistemology events at the Eastern Meeting, I was shocked to notice the immense difference between what is available at the December meeting and what is available at the March meeting. The program committee for the Pacific meeting deserves hearty congratulations! The amount of epistemology available is so extensive that I’ll put the entire list below the fold (with CD-er’s names in bold).

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RELEVANT INFO FOR THE UPCOMING APA MEETING:
(CD-er’s names in bold)
Wednesday Afternoon, December 28
I-D. Symposium: A Priori Knowledge and Justification 2:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Hilary Kornblith (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
Speakers: George Bealer (Yale University)
Michael Devitt (City University of New York–Graduate Center)
Commentator: James Pryor (Princeton University)

Wednesday Evening, December 28
GVI-10. Society for Skeptical Studies 7:30-10:30 p.m.
Chair: William Larkin (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville)
Speakers: Otávio Bueno (University of South Carolina)
“Pyrrhonism and the Empirical Stance”
Brien Ribeiro (University of Tennessee–Chattanooga)
“Clarke and Stroud on the Plane-Spotters”
William Larkin (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville)
“Risk, Relevance, and Context”

Thursday Afternoon, December 29
III-I. Colloquium: Epistemology1:30-4:30 p.m.
Chair: Sharon Ryan (West Virginia University) 1:30-2:30 p.m.
Speaker: Jonathan Schaffer (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
“Knowing the Answer”
Commentator: Jonathan Weinberg (Indiana University) 2:30-3:30 p.m.
Speaker: Elka Shortsleeve (University of Florida)
“Knowledge and Certainty: A Speech-Act Contextualist Account”
Commentator: Adam Leite (Indiana University) 3:30-4:30 p.m.
Speaker: Christopher Tillman (University of Rochester)
“Some Problems for Contextualism”
Commentator: Peter Ludlow (University of Michigan)

Friday Morning, December 30
IV-D. Symposium: Epistemic Permissiveness 9:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Bryan Frances (Fordham University)
Speaker: Roger Lewis White (New York University)
Commentator: Thomas Kelly (Princeton University)

V-C. Information Session: Epistemic Modals 11:15 a.m.-1:15 p.m.
Chair: Andy Egan (Australian National University)
Speakers: Thony Gillies (University of Michigan)
Kai von Fintel (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

V-F. Colloquium: Vagueness 11:15 a.m.-1:15 p.m., Sutton Parlor Center (Second Floor)
Chair: Ted Sider (Rutgers University)
12:15-1:15 p.m.
Speakers: Greg Ray and Ivana Simic (University of Florida)
“A Decisive Refutation of Epistemicism”
Commentator: Roy Sorensen (Dartmouth College)

Friday Afternoon, December 30
VI-C. Symposium: Confirmation Theory Old and New 1:30-4:30 p.m.
Chair: David Christensen (University of Vermont)
Speakers: James Joyce (University of Michigan)
Branden Fitelson (University of California–Berkeley)
Commentator: Patrick Maher (University of Illinois)

VI-I. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Inclusiveness 1:30-4:30 p.m.
Topic: Philosophy and Disability: Reflections on Cognition, Ethics, and Epistemology
Chair: Mark Chekola (Minnesota State University–Moorhead)
Alexa Schriempf (Penn State University)
“An Epistemology of Disability: Deaf Knowing and Testimony’s Epistemic Role”

I’ll put the abstracts available below the fold.

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Eric Neufeld and Scott Goodwin’s article on the Lottery Paradox and the Paradox of the Preface appearing in Computational Intelligence 14(3), 1998, is an overlooked gem. The paper offers a rebuttal to Pollock’s distinction between the lottery from the preface by citing lotteries, such as the Canadian 6-49, whose structure is similar to the preface. Neufeld and Goodwin’s discussion is an important contribution to the body of commentary that is critical of tailor-made solutions designed to fit the particulars of each paradox.

My takeaway from the discussion of the Buridan’s Ass Paradox is that the issue turns on the relationship between reasons and contrastive reasons. Here’s one version of such a principle:

Reason R is a reason to do A (or believe p) only if, for any B (or q) that competes with A (or p), R is a reason to do A rather than B (or believe p rather than believe q).

Armed with such a principle, one can argue that the ass has no reason to choose either bale, and also has no reason to adopt any strategy for breaking the tie between the two bales. For example, the ass can’t flip a coin to break the tie. Not just because asses don’t have opposable thumbs, but because the ass has no reason to identify any result of the flip with a preference for either bale.

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Some have argued that the generality problem Feldman and Conee raise for reliabilism will plague every theory of justification. I don’t recall the precise nature of these arguments, but I wasn’t convinced. I’m worried, however, even though not convinced. Here’s why.

I’ll start by using Chisholmian internalism (conceived as a version of evidentialism) as a test case.

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Below is the announcement:

Special Volume of Social Epistemology on
“Collective Knowledge and Collective Knowers”
We invite submissions for a special issue of the journal Social Epistemology on collective knowledge. Submissions should address the question of whether and how a group of persons can be the subject of epistemic states. In other words, are there collective knowers, and if so, what and how can they know?

More information below the fold.

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One response to the paradox (the starving ass is caught between two equally attractive haybales, and starves from indecision, needing a reason to prefer one to the other in order to eat) is to allow for the possibility, and rationality, of arbitrary actions. One can, for example, decide to choose between the two equally attractive options by flipping a coin. After the flip, the haybales remain equally attractive, but there is an explanation why the ass chooses one bale over the other. This response has implications for the theory of rational action, but I won’t go into that here. What I wonder is if anyone knows of literature proposing other responses to the paradox, or reasons for being dissatisfied with this one?

Link here. The project, led by Jessica Brown, Duncan Pritchard, and Crispin Wright and running from January 2008 through December 2012 (their website has a typo regarding this date, I believe), has two basic components: one on basic knowledge and the other on relativism and contextualism. Among those who have agreed to participate pending AHRC funding, are: Martin Davies, Christopher Hookway, Jonathan Kvanvig, James Pryor, Ralph Wedgwood, and Tim Williamson.

When funded (I’m in an optimistic mood this morning, totally devoid of relevant information, however), this project will be, in my view, one of the most important developments in epistemology in recent memory. This may not even be hyperbolic: it will focus the greatest attention on epistemology in the UK in more than 50 years!

UPDATE: I know of a number of other epistemologists besides those listed above that have been invited to participate in the project, but don’t want to list their names without knowing whether they’ve accepted. If you’ve agreed to participate, or know of others who’ve agreed, please note it in the comments.

UPDATE: On the typo question, it turns out there are two separate plans being pursued for funding the basic knowledge component, and the website dates relate to the first one and do not involve any typo. The dates running through 2012 relate to the second plan which involves AHRC funding.

At www.formalphilosophy.com. The title is Formal Philosophy, by Vincent F. Hendricks and John Symons. Here’s a short blurb about it:

Interviews with: Johan van Benthem, Brian F. Chellas, Anne Fagot-Largeault, Melvin Fitting, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Haim Gaifman, Clark Nøren Glymour, Adolf Grünbaum, Susan Haack, Sven Ove Hansson, Jaakko Hintikka, H. Jerome Keisler, Isaac Levi, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Rohit Parikh, Jeff Paris, Gabriel Sandu, Krister Segerberg, Wolfgang Spohn, Patrick Suppes, Timothy Williamson.

Formal Philosophy is a collection of short interviews based on 5 questions presented to some of the most influential and prominent scholars in formal philosophy. We hear their views on formal philosophy, its aim, scope and how their work fits in these respects.

I don’t have any students that I’m the main advisor for on the market this year, so I haven’t really checked this out in any detail. But a very quick look at the JFP would seem to indicate the job market has improved this year. Going by the on-line versions, these are the numbers from the October JFPs from recent years (year, U.S. jobs advertised, total jobs advertised):

2000: 290, 316
2001: 251, 284
2002: 251, 274
2003: 220, 254
2004: 279, 322
2005: 318, 363