Archive for March, 2006

The department of philosophy at the university of Aberdeen (Scotland) is hosting an international conference on ‘moral contextualism’ on July 4-5 2006. Speakers will include Berit Brogaard, John Greco, John Hawthorne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Alan Thomas, and Ralph Wedgwood. A part of the conference will be devoted to a mini book-symposium on Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s new book ‘Moral Skepticisms’. For more information, please visit the conference homepage at http://www.abdn.ac.uk/philosophy/moralcontextualism/index.shtml

Dear FEWers,

We apologize for the delay (and for some confusion) concerning the final schedule for FEW 2006. This was caused by an overwhelming response, and also by an email-listing snafu. We had so many submissions and queries about FEW this year, that we will not be able to send personalized emails about it. So, I have created a new master database of FEWers, which (I think) is now complete. If you think you should be on our email list, but you did not receive a message that looks a bit like this post, please email me. The schedule has been posted, along with all of the abstracts and all of the papers. Please read as many of these in advance of the meeting as you can. The idea is to hit the ground running.

http ://socrates.berkeley.edu/~fitelson/few/schedule.html

We are encouraging anyone with serious interests in this stuff to attend the meeting. We have a large room this year, so we can accommodate plenty of people. Just let me know if you plan to attend. No registration is necessary. Information about hotels, etc., can be found on the FEW website, at:

http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~fitelson/few/links.html

Graduate students who are on the final program will receive $350 for travel costs. There will probably not be much money left over for other graduate students. But, interested graduate students should send me a query just in case. Also, graduate students should contact me about housing. Many of you will be able to find a place to stay with some of the Berkeley graduate students.

Sahotra and I are looking forward to seeing all of you in May!

Best,
Branden

An Arché workshop on Basic Knowledge will take place in St Andrews on 24-25 November 2006. Speakers will include Jason Stanley, Duncan Pritchard and Jessica Brown. There will be a slot for a graduate student paper. Graduate students, and those who obtained their PhDs within the last twelve months, are invited to submit papers of not more than 5000 words. Please send submissions as email attachments in Word or similar format (no pdf files please) to Carrie Jenkins. Suitable topics include: Sceptical Paradox, Transmission and/or Closure, Non-Evidential Warrant, Internalism and Externalism, and A Priori Knowledge. Particularly welcome are papers which open up new areas of enquiry within these fields, and/or highlight directions in which further research is needed. Travel and subsistence will be covered by Arche for the author of the selected paper.

ADDENDUM: The deadline for submissions is 31 August 2006, and submissions should be prepared for blind review.

Back from the Pacific APA, where the program was the best I’ve ever seen. The program was so good that the only thing to complain about was that there were too many times where 2-3 wonderful sessions were occurring simultaneously. For example, the Stanley book session coincided with the Christensen book session. In my sympathetic moments, I can see a way of looking at these sessions so that overlap is not a strong problem; but, of course, there are then the egocentric moments…

Anyway, fantastic work by the program committee–best APA ever for me! Now I just need to recover from visiting too many bars with so many of my very favorite people in the entire world…

Yesterday was the day: Joe Salerno revealed the source of the knowability paradox! It’s normally called Fitch’s Proof, because Fred Fitch first published it in 1963.

But: Fitch says in a footnote that he owes the idea to an anonymous referee. Joe announced yesterday the results of his investigation.

Would it be fair now to add to Church’s Thesis and Church’s Theorem–Church’s proof?

[All the papers I'm about to mention are available on-line in one form or another here.]

This is not primarily a piece of self-promotion intended to get more people to read more of my work — though of course I’d be happy if it had that effect. No, it’s a piece of self-promotion intended to get folks who do want to read what I have to say about the case for contextualism to read the right things. It seems that many read (& assign) rather stale, old papers that have since been surpassed.

(I guess I have no right to be upset that people read the wrong things: If folks went to the on-line bibliography on contextualism that I myself put on the web, and read what I’ve designated as the “Main Works,” one paper they’d be directed to is one of my old ones. I have to update that page. I’ve been putting new stuff at the top of the page, but haven’t integrated anything from the last couple of years into the “Main Works.”)

I’m not talking here about the application of contextualism to skepticism. On that, people tend to read & assign the right work of mine: “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” Philosophical Review, 1995. Yes, that’s more than a decade old now, and I have more recent papers that advance the discussion in various ways. And, in fact, I really would like it if more folks would read those more recent papers — especially if it might head off some old criticisms that seem always to get repeated. In particular, if you’re at all inclined to mistakenly characterize the account of knowledge I use as a somewhat modified version of Nozick’s account (in fact, mine is what nowadays is called a “safety” account), to think my solution is shot down by the counter-examples to sensitivity accounts of knowledge, or to protest that the philosophy of language I bring to bear on the problem isn’t relevant to the epistemological problem of skepticism (”The real problem here concerns whether we can know things; not whether we can ever truthfully make claims of the form ‘I know that P’!”), you should read “Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses.” And if you think the contextualist’s verdict on a debate between a skeptic (”You don’t know!”) and a Commonsense opponent of hers (”Oh yes I do!”) is that both are speaking the truth, and especially if you’re bothered by that verdict, you should read “Single Scoreboard Semantics.” But if you’re going to read just one thing on the application of contextualism to skepticism, “Solving the Skeptical Problem” is the right choice. (And I should add that while I’ve further defended and elaborated on my solution since SSP, for better or for worse, I don’t think I’ve changed my mind about anything significant in SSP.)

What I am talking about the defense of contextualism itself. On that, too many people seem to read and/or assign “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1992) and/or “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense” (Blackwell Guide to Epistomology, 1999). I’ll put a few words about these papers below the fold, since there are parts of them that might still be useful in various ways. But the newer and better things to read are the following three papers.

“The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism,” Philosophical Quarterly, 2005. The basic argument for contextualism comes from how “know” gets used in ordinary language. This basic argument was [discussed (for those with low standards) / hinted at (for those with high)] in a very preliminary way in my old 1992 paper, CKA, but is given a much better treatment here: I describe what types of cases the contextualist appeals to, and why the contextualist is on such solid ground in putting forward the premises that drive the basic argument: that the positive claim of “knowledge” in the contextualist’s low-standards case and the denial of “knowledge” in the high-standards case are both true. Along the way, I argue against “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism,” an alternative to contextualism that’s been getting a lot of attention lately. If you haven’t read this paper (or heard an accurate account of its contents from someone who has), you just don’t understand what I base my contextualism on. (Incidentally, I’ve recently heard that this paper has been chosen by PQ as one of as one of 10 highlights of their past ten volumes, and, as such, it will soon be available even to non-subscribers free online from the Blackwells Synergy site for some yet-to-be-determined period.)

“Assertion, Knowledge, and Context,” Philosophical Review, 2002. This paper marries contextualism to the knowledge account of assertion, using each to support/defend the other. This paper also plays a role in what I called above the “basic argument” for contextualism. An old worry about that basic argument (mentioned, but not answered, already in my old 1992 paper) is that what the contextualist takes to be varying truth-conditions for knowledge attributions are in fact only varying warranted-assertability-conditions. While I do much to battle that worry in other work, it takes the knowledge account of assertion to make the most definitive case against it, so that part of the basic argument is executed here in AKC. Also, in part 2 of AKC, I give another positive argument for contextualism — this one utilizing the knowledge account of assertion as a key premise.

“’Bamboozled by Our Own Words’: Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming. This paper answers several objections to contextualism, including objections voiced by Stephen Schiffer and John Hawthorne.

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Foley’s Swampman (Fs) arises out of the swamp, produced by a lightning, fully decorated with a vast array of true beliefs. Foley think Fs knows a lot more than we do, but many, probably most, have remained unconvinced. Mike made the following really interesting remark about Fs:

Foley-swampman (Fs) is interesting. So Fs correctly believes that he is a swampman who happens to have only true beliefs. You ask Fs: “Gee, Fs, it seems really unlikely that you would have so many true beliefs and no erroneous beliefs, given that you were formed by a lightning strike. What do you think accounts for that?” Fs says: “Nothing. It’s just a huge coincidence.” Now it seems to me that there really is something irrational about Fs, even though by hypothesis his answer to your question is correct. As a first pass: Fs holds a set of beliefs about where his first-order beliefs came from, on which it is extremely improbable that his first-order beliefs are true (and he acknowledges that); yet he still holds on to those first-order beliefs. That’s a kind of incoherence. (I call this meta-incoherence, because it is the meta-beliefs that fail to cohere with the first-order beliefs.)

Fs is clearly not a hidden variables theorist about his beliefs!

My interest, though, is about mike’s meta-incoherence requirement. Here I want to introduce my cousin-in-law, Dan Kersten, who does vision research at the University of Minnesota. Dan’s work on vision involves what he terms a Bayesian model, and he is investigating the ways in which we construct, and the pitfalls involved in the construction of, a 3-dimensional experience of the world from the sensory input we receive. Last time I talked with Dan, he was reporting that the probability of truth for our 3D beliefs rises as high as .25!

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Rich has a critical review of Hawthorne’s Knowledge and Lotteries here. Looks really interesting!

Most epistemologists recognize that many of the common informal fallacies are epistemically relevant in various ways. Thus, even though tu quoque arguments are irrelevant to the truth of the position being espoused, they are relevant epistemically because one way to provide supporting evidence for a view is to be able to explain away why intelligent people might disagree.

Recently, there has been a flurry of activity in blogdom about the genetic fallacy and whether Dan Dennett committed it in his latest work on the origins of religious belief. Some say he did, some say he didn’t. Those who say he didn’t point out that finding unsavory origins for a belief is epistemically relevant even if it is not relevant to the truth or falsity of a belief.

Well, so it is, sometimes at least. But, of course, any good epistemologist will want a fully general account here, and it is certainly false that finding unsavory origins for a belief always undermines any warrant or justification one might have for the belief.

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We’re hosting an international conference on Epistemic Value in Stirling on August 19th-20th this year. For more details, see the webpage here. Although this webpage is far from complete, it does have details of the keynote speakers and how to register, and more information will be posted as soon as I have it to hand.