Mon 30 Jul 2007
Hawthorne and Stanley’s Knowledge Principle for Good Reasons
Posted by Jon Kvanvig under epistemic paradoxes, justification, knowledge, skepticism
[11] Comments
I’ve been reading Hawthorne and Stanley’s new piece “Knowledge and Action,” (downloadable here at Jason’s website), and will post a couple of things about this really fine piece.
So here’s one issue. Restrict what we are talking about to propositional reasons, either for belief or for action. Think, then, about transmission principles for rational belief. What must be true about the reasons in question for transmission to be possible? The usual answer is that an originating condition can’t transmit something it doesn’t possess already, so if a proposition is one’s reason for believing something, that proposition must itself be rational to believe. With H&S, I’ll assume that we should say similar things about rational action and rational belief on this score, and H&S give a stronger requirement here: in order for one’s reasons for believing q or doing A to be p, one must know that p. I know Peter Unger defends such a principle about rational belief, but he’s a rare exception (and motivated toward strong requirements in service of a skepticism of amazingly wide scope). The more ordinary viewpoint is narrower, insisting only that what gets transmitted must be present, but asking no more than this.
Here I’ll voice a worry I have about the stronger requirement, one concerning rational plans of relatively complex sorts.
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