Certain Doubts

UPDATE 12/2/07 7:24 a.m.: I’ve done a couple of minor corrections again on the h- and g-values, and won’t update them again, so anyone wishing to use these numbers can reference them as having been generated by me using Harzing’s Publish or Perish program (available here for free) on December 2, 2007.

UPDATE 12/1/07 5:30 p.m.: Some of the Hirsch and Egghe numbers were incorrect (see comments 14 and 15 below for the nature of the errors–thanks to Daniel Nolan for noticing the problem), and I’ve now corrected the errors.

I’ve been gathering some data on journals in philosophy and thought it would be useful to many to post a link to it here. The information contained is, first, the ranking of the journal by the ESF. The second and third columns on the spreadsheet give two different metrics that try to measure the scholarly impact of a journal. The first column is the Hirsch number and the second is the Egghe number. I’ll include explanations of these measures below the fold. The last column is the information I’ve gathered from various sources about rejection rates at journals. I’m hoping some readers can fill in some of the gaps that remain, so if you know the rejection rate of a journal that I don’t give, please put it in the comments and I’ll update the spreadsheet. I should note that I’m a bit skeptical of the rejection rate data. The rates are self-reported and in most cases are mere estimates (how else to explain the amazing coincidence of so many with 90% rejection rates?), with no standardization about what counts as a rejection (for example, if your paper is sent back to you as a revise-and-resubmit, does that count as a rejection?). Moreover, there is significant motivation to report as high a rejection rate as possible, since that suggests high standards. In any case, here’s the data that I’ve got.

The journal list contains all the major journals, but is not complete, and is skewed by special issues I’m addressing at my home institution. Let me know of any obvious omissions.

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The site for the 18th European Conference in Artificial Intelligence (ECAI’08) is up. Deadline for papers is 25 February 2008.

Suppose we are motivated to develop a theory of rationality because of our awareness of our own fallibility: truth isn’t transparent to us, and so what we should track as doxastic beings is signs or marks of truth, and a theory of rationality is just an account of what these signs or marks of truth involve. When the signs point one way, we should believe the claim in question; when they don’t, we shouldn’t. And we inquire into such matters because truth isn’t transparent.

Suppose, though, that one is a fallibilist about marks of truth as well as truth itself.
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When the APA hires its new webmaster (ahem), it should consider rethinking how it publishes the Jobs for Philosophers. Since there is an electronic copy of the job listings already, the site should be redesigned to allow searches of the ads. There is a fair amount of standardization to a typical JFP ad already: nearly all ads list rank, AOS, AOC, an application deadline, a geographic region, and a teaching load. (And if an ad doesn’t, then it should.) So why not design the form for advertisers to fill out (online, of course) with an eye to standardizing the order in which this information appears in an ad? This would help the humans reading through them and, from these standardized terms, you’ll have the key terms for searching the listings.
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Annual Formal Epistemology Workshops

We are in the process of organizing our fifth annual formal epistemology workshop (the first, second, third, and fourth workshops were all great successes). The purpose of these workshops is to bring together individuals, both faculty and graduate students, using mathematical methods in epistemology in small focused meetings. Topics treated will include but are not limited to:

Ampliative inference (including inductive logic);
Game theory and decision theory;
Formal learning theory;
Formal theories of coherence:
Foundations of probability and statistics;
Formal approaches to paradoxes of belief and/or action;
Belief revision;
Causal discovery.
Besides papers with respondents, each workshop will typically include short introductory tutorials (three or four topically related presentations) on formal methods. These tutorials will be oriented particularly to graduate students.

The fifth workshop is scheduled for May 14–18, 2008 and will be held at UW–Madison. We are now accepting submissions for FEW 2008. Please send submissions by email to Peter Vranas. Submissions are due — in the form of full papers — by Friday, February 15 2008; notifications of acceptance either as definite presenters or as alternates will be sent out by Friday, March 14, 2008.

Those interested in participating, either by presenting papers, responding, or providing tutorials, or in helping with organization, should contact one of the local organizers listed below. We can contribute $500 in travel funds for every graduate student who presents or comments on a paper.

Peter Vranas
Malcolm Forster
UW–Madison

the number of epistemology jobs in the November JFP is interesting. I don’t recall seeing such a large number before, though I may be misremembering. It strikes me, however, that a number of top programs are searching in the area, as well as a strong group of mid-level places as well. Seems a good time for the subdiscipline.

Here’s the places I noticed where epistemology is mentioned as at least one of the top priorities for the search in question:
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Anybody know why the November issue isn’t out yet?

Bas van Fraassen once characterized the difference between English and Prussian conceptions of law this way: in the former, everything not explicitly prohibited is permissible; in the latter, everything no explicitly permitted is prohibited. Not likely to be quite accurate, but instructive nonetheless.

I was thinking about this idea with respect to theories of rationality and irrationality, in the context of some work I’ve been doing on the concept of mens rea. Suppose you prefer an English-style theory of rationality and you conceive of irrationality analogous to the way you conceive of criminal behavior: there is no crime without a guilty mind. Then we should expect legal theory on the concept of mens rea to be relevant to the nature of epistemic principles.

If so, the question is what level of mens rea involvement is requirement for an epistemic crime. (more…)

I’m bored with little epistemic on my mind. So a story befitting my present geographic location and level of tequila consumption. There’s a detectable epistemic residue to the story, which the sophisticated reader will notice and on which I will comment at the end.

Last quarter of 19th century. Ship’s captain hears the call from the crow’s nest: “Pirate ship, pirate ship!” “To your stations, maties! Boy, bring my red shirt!” Boy brings shirt. Captain dons. Battle lasts all day. Terrible fighting, but the ship’s crew prevails. “Well done!” says the Captain. The boy agrees, but asks, “Why did you wear your red shirt?” “Because I might have been wounded, and if I bleed and the crew can tell it, they may become discouraged and lose the fight. So I wore the red shirt to hide any wounds.” “Very smart,” thinks the boy.

Next day. Captain hears a new call from the crow’s nest: “20 pirate ships, Captain, 20!” “To your stations, maties! Boy, bring my brown pants!”

Epistemic moral of the story:

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Henry Kyburg died Tuesday evening in Rochester, New York. He was 79. His recent diary recorded his thoughts about large cardinals, his cattle dogs, and the philosophy of mind. Judging from the entries — sharp, playful, and ironic to the end — the stroke Henry suffered last year hadn’t blunted his skepticism about understanding the mind. Instead, he took the experience to only bolster his position.

I was Henry’s student. His last, it turned out. And I miss him.

Os antigos invocavam as Musas
Alvaro de Campos (heteronym of Fernando Pessoa)
Translated into English by David Butler.

The ancients used to invoke the Muses.
We invoke ourselves.
I don’t know if the Muses used to appear —
No doubt that would depend on both invoked and invocation —
But I do know that we don’t appear.
How many times have I stooped
Over the well that I suppose myself to be
And bleated ‘Ah!’ so as to hear an echo,
And haven’t heard anything more than I’ve seen —
The vague, dark lustre with which water gleams
There in the uselessness of the depths …
Not a single echo for me …
Only, vaguely, a face
Which must be mine, since it can’t be another’s.
It is an almost invisible thing,
Except as I luminously see
Down there, in the depths …
In the silence and in the deceptive light of the depths …

Some Muse!…