Certain Doubts

Jeff Helzner has started a new blog, Philosophy, Science, and Method, which will cover philosophy that has serious contact with either mathematics or science. Philosophy, Science, and Method is the title of a celebrated collection of essays written in honor of Ernest Nagel. Jeff’s blog is not only a tribute to Nagel, but promises to become a very nice continuation of his legacy as well.

Organized by Heather Battaly:
Thurs June 26-Fri June 27, 2008, Marriott Fullerton, adjacent to Cal State Fullerton campus,
Website: http://hss.fullerton.edu/philosophy/fipc.htm

Speakers include: Jason Baehr, Heather Battaly, Guy Axtell, Roger Crisp, Wayne Riggs, Miranda Fricker, Amy Coplan, Michael Brady, Thomas Hurka, Linda Zagzebski, Nomy Arpaly, and Christine Swanton.

Suppose you are tempted to agree with Lewis et. al. that knowledge doesn’t imply belief. Lewis’s example is of a timid student, uncertain of a given claim who will only hesitatingly answer, but answers correctly nonetheless. Not the most persuasive example: belief is compatible with some level of uncertainty, and it isn’t clear that the student knows that, e.g., Lincoln was assassinated in 1865.

Here’s a more interesting worry, however. Suppose Lewis is adamant about the example or some suitable refinement of it: the student knows the answer, and thus has propositional knowledge of some sort; and the student doesn’t believe the claim in question because he takes himself to be guessing (again, not a compelling inference, but I’ll let it go). Given such a position, true belief has something going for it in terms of a connection to action that knowledge doesn’t. To use Socrates’s example, you’re better off hiring a guide with true opinion about how to get to Larissa than hiring one with knowledge when that knowledge isn’t accompanied by belief. For, as in Lewis’s student example, we can expect hesitation and indecision from those who know but lack belief, and we have no such similar expectation concerning those with true belief. In fact, in the student case, if Lewis is right, the student might know and simply refuse to answer at all because of the lack of belief. The analogue in Socrates’s example would be a knowledgeable guide who won’t go any further at some point on the journey because he is uncertain which way to go. So, if you agree with Lewis, it looks like you should downplay the idea that knowledge is better than true opinion. Meno wondered why we prize knowledge over true opinion. If Lewis is right, such puzzlement is a confusion–the only general truth in the area is that when practical affairs are in view, true belief is preferable to knowledge. Sometimes knowledge is just as good as true belief, but in other cases it is not as good.

That implication strikes me as a mark against Lewis’s claim, though of course not a conclusive one.

I’ve added a new page to the right side bar containing all the journal information I have (gathered by me and Greg Wheeler). As before, caution is urged in the use of H- and G-numbers, and some suspicion is warranted for the rejection rate information as well. First, there is a temptation to report higher rejection rates to foster an appearance of quality, and the data themselves are not credible: too many journals report an exact 90% rejection rate, and the numbers are too often in increments of 5 percentage points. I’d bet we’re getting estimates at best, and enhancement as well. At any rate, the information may be of some use, so I’m making it a permanent page.

Though it seems to have come out back in September, I have only now come across Patrick Rysiew’s article on “Epistemic Contextualism,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Patrick seems to have done a terrific job of explaining the view and laying out the issues and controversies that are involved. The article is quite extensive, and so isn’t what you’re looking for if you’ve encountered references to contextualism in epistemology and you are just looking for a very quick explanation of what that is. But, because it explains the main issues surrounding the view that are currently under discussion, it would be a great resource for advanced undergraduate students who are interested in contextualism are looking for good paper topics on the view. They would not only be guided to what the important issues are, but also to good discussions of those issues in the philosophical literature. And it’s very well-suited for graduate students and for professional philosophers who are thinking of doing some research in the area. If, for example, you have some ideas you’re thinking of writing up, but want to see how they fit into the current state of the discussion, Patrick’s article would be a great place to start.

I’ve been feeling guilty (though not guilty enough to be moved to action!) that it’s been so long since I updated my on-line bibliography on contextualism in epistemology. (It’s become so out-of-date that I won’t even link to it here.) Now I feel much better: I can just send people Patrick’s article.

“Law and Evidence”
Dartmouth College, June 20-21, 2008

More information here.

“Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology: The Philosophy of Alvin Goldman”
May 19-20, 2008
Duesseldorf, Germany (Heinrich Heine University)
Organizers: Gerhard Schurz and Markus Werning

More information here.

The volume, edited (and with an introductory essay) by Jennifer Lackey, contains original articles by Peter Lipton, Linda Zagzebski, Melissa Koenig and Paul Harris, Patrick Rysiew, Paul Faulkner, Al Casullo, John Greco, Marc Moffit, Arnon Keren, and Jonathan Adler.

See here for details:

http://epistemejournal.wordpress.com/contents/volume-4/issue-3/

Cheers,

Sandy

5th Biennial Rochester Graduate Epistemology Conference

Keynote Speaker: Alvin Goldman, Rutgers.

Commentator: Richard Feldman, University of Rochester

When and Where: October 10-11, 2008; University of Rochester, Rochester, NY

Website with further information and a call for papers:
http://mail.rochester.edu/~tdougher/Conference_Papers_2008.htm.

The New York Times has put up an interactive version of the Monty Hall problem, which allows you to play each strategy (switch or stay) and run up counts.